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We ask how patient knowledge of appropriate antibiotic usage affects both physicians prescribing
behavior and the physician-patient relationship. We conduct an audit study in which a pair of  simulated
patients with identical flu-like complaints visits the same physician. Simulated patient A is instructed
to ask a question that showcases his/her knowledge of appropriate antibiotic use, whereas patient B
is instructed to say nothing beyond describing his/her symptoms. We find that a patient’s knowledge
of appropriate antibiotics use reduces both antibiotic prescription rates and drug expenditures. Such
knowledge also increases physicians’ information provision about possible side effects, but has a negative
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China has a high rate of antibiotic usage for both  inpatients  and  outpatients.  Two  thirds  of 
inpatients use antibiotics in China, compared to about a third of inpatients in many other 
countries (Hu, Liu, and Peng, 2003). The World Health Organization has recommended that 
Chinese hospitals decrease the rate of inpatient antibiotic usage to 30% (Guo 2004); the 
Chinese Government has suggested a more modest reduction to a target rate of 50% (The 
Ministry of Health of the People's Republic of China, 2000). Antibiotic use is high among 
outpatients in China as well: forty to 60% use antibiotics (Dong et al. 1999; Zhang et al. 2008). 
In comparison, in the U.S., the outpatient rate of antibiotic use is between 15% and 18% 
(Roumie et al., 2005). 
Antibiotic abuse has substantial costs.  Perhaps the gravest concern is that it will 
contribute the rise of “superbugs” that are resistant to most or all forms of antibiotics and 
threaten global health.  The Chinese have already seen increased antibiotic resistance 
compared to Western countries.  In China in 1999 and 2001, the mean prevalence of 
resistance among hospital and community-acquired infections was 41% and 28%, respectively. 
Comparable figures for the U.S. were 17 to 20% and 13% (Zhang et al., 2006).   Moreover, 
the high prevalence of antibiotic resistance in China is accompanied by a rapid growth in the 
rate of resistance. The annual growth rate was on average 22% between 1994 and 2000 in 
China, while the growth rate was only 6% between 1999 and 2002 in the U.S. (Zhang et al. 
2006).  
Resistant bacteria create immediate costs as well since treating them increases medical 
expenditures and they may lead to death from uncontrolled infections (Phelps,1989; Yao and 
Yang, 2008).  A second immediate cost stems from adverse drug reactions. Between 2001 4 
 
and 2005, Xiao et al. (2010) estimate that there were 14,738,000 incidents of moderate to 
severe antibiotic adverse drug reactions in China yearly, and that 150,000 patients died. 
Treating these reactions cost 2.91 to 13.93 billion RMB and led to estimated social 
productivity losses of about 340 million to 1.62 billion RMB yearly (Xiao et al. 2010).   
Several reasons have been advanced for antibiotic abuse.  One strand of the literature 
blames the consumer.  The argument is that patients view antibiotics as a panacea, and 
therefore demand them even when they are unwarranted (Cars and Hakansson, 1995; Sun et 
al., 2009).  Patients may also demand newer antibiotics, perceiving them to be more 
efficacious, or they may fail to follow dosage instructions (Bi, Tong, and Parton, 2000; Sun et 
al., 2009).  If patients expect antibiotics, and doctors are pressed for time, they may find it 
easier to write a prescription than to explain to the patient why it is not necessary (Schwartz et 
al, 1998). On the supply side, physicians may overprescribe antibiotics because they lack 
professional knowledge about proper antibiotic usage (Yao and Yang, 2008; Sun et al., 2009) 
or because they want to prevent potential infections (Dar-Odeh et al., 2010). 
However a third reason for antibiotic abuse that is likely to be particularly important in 
China, is that physicians have substantial monetary incentives to prescribe medications. In 
China, most outpatients are seen by doctors in hospital clinics. Hospitals rely heavily on drug 
sales to make a profit: Drug sales account for over 50% of all hospital revenues and antibiotic 
sales account for 47% of all drug sales (Chen, 2005; Gong, 2009).  Kickbacks from 
pharmaceutical companies provide further economic incentives for physicians, with 
physicians receiving payments of up to 20% of the value of the prescription (Day, 2006; Yip 
and Hsiao, 2008).  Thus doctors not only have an incentive to prescribe, they have an 5 
 
incentive to prescribe more expensive drugs, which are often the newer and more powerful 
antibiotics.    
It is possible then that the high level of antibiotic abuse in China represents an egregious 
example of physician “induced demand”.  As Dranove (1988) argued, antibiotics are 
particularly ripe for demand inducement because they are unlikely to inflict harm on most 
patients, and because it is difficult for the patient to know for certain whether they are needed 
or not.  However, it has been difficult to identify demand inducement in observational data 
given problems such as endogenous matching of doctors and patients, and unobserved patient 
characteristics. Recently, many observers have argued that small area variations in the fraction 
of patients receiving services are evidence of inappropriate use of medical care; but without 
further information it is impossible to know whether this interpretation is correct, or whether 
overuse in some areas is driven by the demand or the supply side. 
This study proposes a new method for examining physician demand inducement and 
applies it to the problem of antibiotic abuse in China:  We conduct an audit study with 
simulated patients.
1 We then run a field experiment to test the effectiveness of a simple 
intervention designed to reduce antibiotic abuse by having patients signal to doctors that they 
have information about inappropriate antibiotic use. 
More specifically, we trained students to act as simulated patients with identical flu-like 
complaints.  These patients were sent to physicians in hospital clinics for check-ups. In the 
first audit study, we chose two large cities and one rural area (a county in a coastal province) as 
study areas in order to assess the extent to which antibiotic abuse appears to result from 
                                                        
1 There is a literature on “medical audit studies” but this usually refers to an analysis of a sample of patient 
records. 6 
 
demand inducement.  None of our simulated patients were sick, none described symptoms 
that merited the prescription of antibiotics, and none asked for antibiotics. Yet 65% of 
simulated patients in urban areas and 55% of simulated patients in rural areas received 
prescriptions for antibiotics.  Moreover, doctors tended to prescribe more expensive drugs 
rather than cheaper “old-line” antibiotics: 24% of urban patients (28% of rural patients) 
received prescriptions for cephalosporin conditional on getting a prescription, whereas only 
14% (15% rural) received prescriptions for penicillin.  
These prescriptions represented a heavy financial burden for the average consumer. Drug 
expenditures per person were 84.18 RMB in City 1, 50.68 RMB in City 2 and 52.83 RMB in 
the rural area, amounts that represent 4.1%, 2.4% and 4.2% respectively of the average 
monthly personal income in each location.
2 Finally, after writing a prescription for the 
simulated patient, 85% of physicians in City 1 and 47% of physicians in City 2 prescribed for 
the simulated patient’s absent sister when requested to do so.
3 
The field experiment was an audit study designed to see whether sending the physician a 
signal that the patient was informed about inappropriate antibiotic use would reduce 
prescription rates.  We sent pairs of well-matched simulated patients, A and B, to the same 
physician, with a short time interval between their audits. The pair followed the same 
transcript except that following the physical examination, patient A said “I learned from the 
internet that simple flu/cold patients should not take antibiotics.”  Thus, A signaled to the 
physician that they had some knowledge of inappropriate antibiotic use, while B did not. 
                                                        
2 These figures are drawn from the Statistical Yearbooks of the two cities for 2009 and the County 
Yearbook for 2009. 
3 Rural physicians were not asked to prescribe for an absent sister.  Given the rural physician’s lower 
volume of patients per day, we thought they might notice two such requests coming from otherwise 
identical patients. 7 
 
We find that the signal reduced the probability of receiving an antibiotic prescription by 25 
percentage points, from 64% for patient B to 39% for patient A.    The signal also reduced drug 
expenditures from an average of 145.81 RMB for patient B to 105.84 RMB for patient A. 
Finally, patients who signaled knowledge of antibiotics received more information about 
possible drug side effects than apparently uninformed patients, but fewer polite responses 
from physicians. 
Our paper makes two important contributions.  First, by applying the audit study 
methodology which has been used in other contexts to medical care, we are able to show that a 
significant amount of antibiotic abuse in China is due to physician induced demand, which in 
turn is likely driven by strong financial incentives.  To our knowledge, this is the first time an 
audit study with simulated patients has been applied to an examination of the appropriateness 
of medical care.  Second, we show that a simple intervention designed to signal patient 
knowledge can dramatically reduce the abuse of antibiotics.  It may be possible to achieve 
similar reductions in antibiotic use by for example, a widespread public advertising campaign 
noting that antibiotics are not appropriate for the treatment of simple colds and the flu, or by 
requiring hospitals to post notices with this information in examination rooms.  If physician 
financial incentives are an important problem underlying the abuse, then regulation of 
physician prescribing behavior or more far-reaching reforms to the system of financing 
hospitals and physicians are also likely to be warranted. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II  provides some background 
knowledge, Section III describes the study design, Section IV explains the empirical model, 
Section V presents the results of the study, and Section VI marks the conclusion. 8 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
In this section, we provide background on the induced demand literature, provide some 
discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of our audit study methodology, and offer a 
brief survey about the literature on patient “empowerment” that inspired our choice of 
intervention strategy.  
Physician Induced Demand 
As McGuire (2000) notes in his review of the literature on physician agency, “The basic 
premise behind PID (physician induced demand) is that physicians may exploit the 
information gap between themselves and patients (page 513).”  However, there have been 
remarkably few attempts to test this assumption directly.  Instead, most empirical tests of the 
PID theory either follow Fuchs (1978) and examine the effect of physician density on the 
consumption of procedures, or they examine the effect of physician fee changes on the volume 
of services rendered (e.g. Rice, 1983; McGuire and Pauly, 1991; Yip, 1998).  Gruber and 
Owings (1996) take a somewhat different tack and examine the effect of patient availability on 
the use of Cesarean section for delivery.   
All of these papers take as their starting point a model in which physicians trade off the 
income they can gain from inducing patients to consume unnecessary services against a cost of 
engaging in inducement.  This cost can either be in terms of a direct reduction in utility, or an 
erosion of the physician’s reputation (and his/her ability to induce demand in future).   
Attempts to test these models empirically have run into many difficulties.  For example, 
Dranove and Wehner (1994) debunk one popular instrumental variables approach, which is to 
use the local supply of physicians as an instrument.  They show that using this instrument, 9 
 
childbirths appear to be induced, which is unlikely.  Similarly, changes in physician fees can 
affect demand as well as supply, given that most patients face copayments (Heaton and 
Holland, 2009). A notable recent empirical test of PID is Iizuka (2007) who examines the 
prescription drug market in Japan.  He finds that doctors’ prescribing patterns are influenced 
by the size of the markup that they are allowed to charge on the drugs.    
Another strand of the literature follows Wennberg and Gittelsohn (1973) and examines 
“small area variations” in the utilization of medical procedures.  It has been shown that there 
are large variations in the use of some procedures, and that these variations are unrelated to 
average patient health outcomes (Sutherland, Fischer, and Skinner. 2009).  These variations 
have been widely interpreted as evidence of excessive provision of medical care (e.g. Fuchs, 
2004).  However, Chandra and Staiger (2007) argue that the true picture is more complex 
since patients in high spending areas who need high-tech care are better off in those areas, 
while patients who would benefit from lower tech care may be worse off.  
Pauly (1980) attempts to address the role of information by arguing that low income 
patients in big cities (where information about each physician may be less available) are most 
likely to suffer from demand inducement.  Using micro-level data from 1970, he finds some 
evidence that this is the case.  Bunker and Brown (1974) and Hay and Leahy (1982) attempt 
to examine the role of information by looking at the use of services by physicians and their 
families.  Both find evidence that doctor’s families are more likely to use services, which 
would seem to go against the information hypothesis. However, it is possible that doctors have 
access to better quality or lower cost services (through professional courtesies).   
Through our audit study approach, we will provide evidence both on the extent to which 10 
 
antibiotic abuse is induced by physicians, and on the extent to which it depends on the 
information available to consumers. 
Advantages and Disadvantages of the Audit Study Approach 
Audit studies are used in numerous settings, especially where discrimination is suspected 
(Pager 2007).  This method can isolate effects of a particular variable through the use of 
matched pairs of testers and random assignment.  Moreover, an in-person audit can provide 
not only quantitative data on the outcomes of the audit, but also qualitative information on the 
process of the audit (Pager 2007).  In our study we collect both quantitative data about the 
whether or not an antibiotic is prescribed, and qualitative information about the patient’s 
experience. 
Audit studies are not without potential weaknesses.  A primary concern is effective 
matching (Heckman and Siegelman, 1993). In the context of our study, effective matching 
means that from the point of view of the physicians, pairs of simulated patients are identical 
except for their knowledge of antibiotics.  We took two measures to achieve effective 
matching. First, we designed detailed protocols and provided extensive training to ensure that 
simulated patients dressed and behaved in a similar manner and gave the same chief symptoms.   
Second, in the experiment involving pairs of simulated patients, the roles of A and B were 
randomly assigned.  Since the two students switch roles, we can include patient fixed effects 
in our models to further reduce the possibility that personal characteristics accounted for the 
different results between simulated patients A and B. 
Another concern in an audit study is that testers’ awareness of the experiment may affect 
their expectations and/or behaviors and thus influence the results.  For example, in a study on 11 
 
racial discrimination in hiring, a black experimenter may be more nervous or less confident 
than a white experimenter due to the expectation of racial discrimination (Pager 2007). 
Therefore, any observed differences in hiring patterns between black and white testers could 
reflect subtle differences in their behavior.   
Since our simulated patients could observe that the only difference between the scripts 
followed by patients A and B was the statement about antibiotics, we did tell them that the 
purpose of the experiment was to see if a statement reflecting antibiotic knowledge would 
affect prescription patterns.  We tried to minimize the potential impact of this knowledge 
through training.  As discussed further below, simulated patients were trained to dress 
properly, to strictly follow the standard protocol, and to behave in an even-mannered way 
during the outpatient visit so that, to the physicians, they differed only in terms of patient 
knowledge. 
We also check that there is no difference in the physician’s reaction to A and B prior to 
receiving the signal that Patient A is informed about appropriate antibiotic use.  If A and B’s 
behavior differed in a way that affected the doctor-patient interaction, then we might expect to 
see differences appearing during the initial patient examination.    However, as we show below, 
there were no significant differences in the way doctors treated patients prior to patient A’s 
comment about antibiotic use. 
Background Literature on Patient Empowerment 
As discussed above, our intervention focuses on signaling to the doctor that the patient is 
informed about appropriate antibiotic use in cold and flu patients.  Our focus on information 
is a natural outgrowth of the literature on induced demand, which emphasizes information 12 
 
asymmetry.  However, there is also a literature in medicine about patient education or 
“empowerment” which we briefly summarize here.  
It has been argued that educating patients on medication options can increase the patients’ 
authority over a range of decisions, particularly treatment choice (Angelmar and Berman 
2007). Empirical studies on the effects of patient empowerment can be divided into two 
groups: a) Those that focus on effects on the prescription practices of physicians, and b) those 
that focus on effects on the patient-physician relationship. 
Research has shown that patient empowerment can affect physicians’ diagnosing and 
prescribing behavior. Some researchers have found that patient displays of knowledge can 
positively influence physicians’ practices and improve patients’ health.  For example, Hollon 
et al. (2003) report that in comparison with matched control groups, women who are familiar 
with osteoporosis drugs due to Direct-to-Consumer Advertising (DTCA) are nine times more 
likely to receive a bone densitometry, which helps physicians diagnose osteoporosis at an 
earlier stage. Weissman et al. (2003) also note that the more patients know about medical 
drugs, the more likely it is that physicians will identify new conditions in patients who were 
previously either under-diagnosed or undertreated.
4  
A second line focus of the patient empowerment literature asks how patient knowledge 
affects the patient-physician relationship.  Whereas some researchers argue that patient 
                                                        
4 Other researchers argue that patient knowledge does not necessarily either improve treatment or benefit 
health. For instance, Mintzes et al. (2003) find that even when physicians doubt the efficacy of drugs 
patients request, they still prescribe requested drugs more than 70% of the time. Moreover, patient requests 
can have a potentially harmful effect. Kravitz et al. (2005) discusses an example in which a physician 
prescribes a requested anti-depression medication, rather than doing a careful examination and discovering 
a patient’s underlying hypothyroidism.   However, our design explicitly abstracts from issues arising from 
patient requests for medication.  13 
 
knowledge motivates more effective discussions between patients and physicians, others are 
skeptical of this claim, as they fear that patient knowledge both decreases patients’ trust in 
physicians and erodes the authority of physicians (Maguire, 1999; Kravitz, 2000, Jagsi, 2007). 
By isolating the effect of information in our audit study, we provide new evidence on how 
patient knowledge affects the patient-physician relationship. 
 
III. STUDY DESIGN 
Our study includes two field audit studies. The first was conducted in City 1 and a rural 
county from January 2008 to March 2008 and in City 2 in January 2009.    The goal of this first 
study was to assess the rate of inappropriate antibiotic usage for flu/cold patients.    The second 
study was conducted in City 1 from November 2008 to February 2009.  In this experiment, 
we use the audit study method to examine the effect of patient knowledge on health care 
utilization and service quality. 
The First Audit Study 
We began the first audit study by designing a standard protocol which appears in the 
Appendix.  In the protocol, the chief complaint for all simulated patients is, “For the last two 
days, I’ve been feeling fatigued. I have a light fever, slight dizziness, a sore throat, and a poor 
appetite. This morning, the symptoms worsened so I took my body temperature. It was 99°F.”  
We purposely chose very minor symptoms so that it would be difficult for physicians to 
determine if the infections were viral or bacterial without further tests. 
Since antibiotics are only effective in treating infections caused by a bacterium, it is 
important for a physician to know the kind of infection a patient acquires before prescribing 14 
 
antibiotics.  According to the official guidelines (Ministry of Health of the People's Republic 
of China, 2004), antibiotics should only be prescribed when bacterial infections are confirmed 
by a patient’s symptoms and the results of blood or urine tests.  Hence, doctors faced with 
these vague symptoms should not have prescribed antibiotics.  
In the rural area, we restricted our sample to general public hospitals at the county and 
town level. In City 1 and City 2, we restricted our sample to general public hospitals with at 
least 800 beds. We restricted our sample to large general public hospitals because in China, 
most outpatient visits take place in hospitals rather than in clinics:    In 2008, 61% of outpatient 
visits took place in hospitals versus 39% in clinics (Ministry of Health of the People's 
Republic of China 2009).
5 The equivalent of a U.S. primary care physician does not really 
exist, so a visit to a hospital or clinic is often the counterpart to a visit to a physician’s office in 
the U.S. (Hsiao and Liu, 1996; Yip, Wang and Liu, 1998; Hew, 2006; Eggleston et al. 2008;).  
We excluded private hospitals because in 2008, 87% of hospital outpatient visits took place in 
public hospitals (Ministry of Health of the People's Republic of China, 2009).  We excluded 
specialized public hospitals because in 2008, 91% of hospital outpatient visits took place in 
general hospitals (Ministry of Health of the People's Republic of China, 2009).  Clearly, 
general public hospitals in China are the main medical service providers. 
We obtained a list of all general public hospitals with more than 800 beds from the local 
Health Department. We randomly choose ten large general public hospitals in City 1 and eight 
                                                        
5 According to the 2009 Yearbook of Health in People's Republic of China, hospitals included general 
hospitals, sanitariums, health service centers, urban/rural health centers; outpatient departments, women and 
children care agencies, and specialized centers. The numbers of outpatient visits treated in these settings 
were 1.7 billion, 1.5 million, 171 million, 828 million, 51 million, 131 million and 18 million people, 
respectively. In total, there were 2.9 billion outpatient visits in hospitals in 2008, accounting for 61 percent 
of all outpatient visits. Clinics included infirmaries, health service stations, village clinics, and they served 
424 million, 84 million, and 1.4 billion outpatients respectively. 15 
 
in City 2.  Following a similar procedure, 52 general hospitals were randomly chosen in the 
rural area.  Our budget permitted us to recruit 39 college students to serve as simulated 
patients, with an age range of 18 to 22 years. Specifically, we recruited 10 simulated patients 
in City 1, 8 in City 2, and 19 in the rural area.   In City 1, each of the 10 students was assigned 
10 hospital visits, resulting in an overall sample of 100 observations; in City 2, each student 
was assigned 8 hospital visits for a sample of 64 observations.  Because hospitals were more 
spread out in the rural areas, and transportation was more difficult, in the rural area 9 students 
were each assigned 3 hospital visits and the remaining 10 students were each assigned 4 
hospital visits, resulting in a total of 67 (9*3+10*4) visits.  The total number of visits in the 
three sample areas was 231 (100+64+67).  Of these, two observations had to be dropped (in 
City 2), one because the student went to the wrong hospital, and one because the student went 
to an Emergency Room rather than to the Department of Respiratory Diseases or the 
Department of Internal Medicine.  In China, non-urgent care patients typically present at the 
department that they expect to be seen in.  We instructed our simulated patients to go to the 
Department of Respiratory Diseases, or, if there was no such department, to the Department of 
Internal Medicine.   
Simulated patients underwent nine hours of group instruction and individual practice, 
during which they received instructions on the transcript and how to behave, dress, etc. We 
also instructed them to give the chief complaint at a normal speech rate of around 22 seconds 
so that they did not speak too fast or too slow. The main goal was to standardize the simulated 
patients’ performance and appearance. To ensure that simulated patients were well trained, 
after the group instruction and individual practice, simulated patients tested the protocol five 16 
 
times in out-of-sample hospitals before the actual implementation of the first audit study.   
The protocol for the audit study is displayed in Figure I. First, the physician collects the 
chief complaint and a clinical history from the simulated patient. The patient does not claim 
nausea, sputum, or other clinical symptoms that are not included in the chief complaint, nor do 
they claim any previously related clinical history. 
Second, the physician gives a physical examination, which is likely to include temperature 
taking, tonsil checks, auscultation, etc. Third, the physician diagnoses and decides whether or 
not to give a prescription.  If the physician does prescribe medications, the simulated patient 
waits for three to four seconds for the physician to voluntarily inform him/her of any side 
effects. If the physician does not supply such information, the simulated patient asks for it. 
Fourth, in the experiments in City 1 and City 2, the simulated patient asks the physician for 
a prescription for his/her “absent sister” who has similar symptoms. We did not ask this absent 
sister question in the rural area because rural hospital doctors see fewer patients per day, and a 
question about an “absent sister” is not a common one.  We were concerned that having 
several patients repeat a rare question might seem strange to a physician and hence might 
influence their behavior.  Fifth, the simulated patient thanks the physician before leaving the 
office.. 
If the simulated patient receives a prescription, we calculate drug expenditures as follows:  
In 17% of all cases the total drug expenditure is listed on the prescription; In 57% of all cases, 
simulated patients go to a pricing window to obtain total drug  
expenditures.  In the remaining 26% of all cases in which we did not obtain drug prices from 




Finally, we asked simulated patients to complete an on-site survey immediately after they 
finished each outpatient visit. The questions covered information about the physician and the 
complete check-up process, including inquiries the physician made, the physical examination, 
the diagnosis, and the type and price of the drugs prescribed (if applicable). 
The Second Field Experiment 
For our second field experiment, we recruited eight college students, four males and four 
females, from a local university as simulated patients.  We randomly chose 16 large general 
public hospitals with over 800 beds out of the 23 hospitals within 13 miles of a major 
university as our sample hospitals.  As in the first experiment, simulated patients underwent 
nine hours of group training and individual practice. This time, however, the four male and 
four female students were grouped into four matched pairs; in each pair, simulated patients A 
and B shared the same gender, a similar age, and physical appearance. Throughout our study, 
the pairing was fixed and each of the four pairs visited 16 physicians, resulting in 128 
observations total.  In order to investigate differences between chief and attending physicians, 
the first member of the pair to go in was instructed to ask for the chief physician in about one 
third of the pair visits. 
Before each audit, the roles of A and B and the order of their visits to the hospital were 
randomly assigned within each pair.  Since the roles of A and B were chosen randomly, each 
student played role A approximately as often as role B.  As the sequence of their visits was 
also randomly assigned, simulated patient A visited the physician first or second with almost 
                                                        
6 Baidu is the biggest Chinese search engine. Website: http://www.baidu.com. 18 
 
equal frequency. Each member of a pair visited the physician in the same half day, either in the 
morning or in the afternoon. Unless they were requesting a chief physician, the “first in” 
patient did not request any particular physician.  However, two hours after the first simulated 
patient visited a physician, the other member of the pair approached the registration desk to 
request the same physician. 
During the outpatient visit, simulated patients reported the same chief complaint and 
followed the same procedures as in the first audit study. Unlike the first audit study, however, 
after the physical examination, A said “I learned from the internet that simple flu/cold patients 
should not take antibiotics. Is that correct?” Regardless of the reply the physician gave, A 
simply listened and nodded without further questions. In contrast, B did not say anything at 
this point in the visit. Thus, A and B played the role of the well-informed and less-informed 
patient, respectively. 
To analyze the effects of patient knowledge on service quality, we had simulated patients 
complete an additional evaluation form in addition to the on-site summary form.  After 
completing all the audits, simulated patients evaluated the service they received from each 
physician. They rated on a 1 to 5 scale (low to high) the service and their degree of satisfaction. 
The last question on the evaluation form asked simulated patients how willing they were to 
recommend the physician to their own parents in the event that their parents had similar 
symptoms.  A zero indicated that they were against recommending the physician while a 10 
indicated that they would definitely recommend the physician. 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL MODELS 19 
 
Our first audit study asks whether the high rates of antibiotic use in China can be plausibly 
accounted for by physician behavior.  Given that our young, healthy patients neither 
requested antibiotics nor gave symptoms that suggested that antibiotics were appropriate, a 
large and positive level of antibiotic prescription is a cause for concern.    We also examine the 
data to see how frequently physicians prescribe more expensive classes of antibiotics rather 
than penicillin, and we look to see whether there are large differences in the prescription rate 
across areas, consistent with the literature on small-area variations in the U.S..  
In the second experimental audit study, we can assess the effects of the information 
intervention by comparing the fraction of the time patient A received an antibiotic prescription 
to the fraction of time patient B received one.    However, given that there are some observable 
differences between the simulated patients and physicians, and that practice patterns may vary 
from one hospital to another, we also estimate models that include patient characteristics, 
physician characteristics, hospital fixed effects and/or patient fixed effects.  We also control 
for whether a patient was the first or second patient to see the doctor in all our models.   
To be more specific, in order to analyze the data from the second experiment, we first 
estimate models of the following form:  
(1) Yijk = α0 + α1RoleAijk + α2Xi + α3Zj + α4Go_firstijk + εijk   
where i indicates the simulated patient, j indicates the physician, k indicates the hospital, Yijk is 
the outcome of interest for simulated patient i's visit with physician j in hospital k; RoleAijk is a 
dummy equal to 1 if simulated patient i plays role A in the visit with physician j in hospital k, 
and 0 if he/she plays role B; Xi is a vector of control variables including the simulated patient’s 
gender and age; Zj is a vector of control variables including the physician j’s gender, title, and 20 
 
a categorical variable for the physician’s age, divided into four groups: 20-30, 30-40, 40-50 
and 50+ years;
7 and Go_Firstijk is a dummy which equals 1 if simulated patient i visits 
physician j first in the pair at hospital k , and 0 if this simulated patient is second in the pair. 
We next estimate models including hospital fixed effects.  Our most restrictive models 
include patient fixed effects as well and have the following form: 
(2) Yijk = β0 + β1RoleAijk + β2Zi + β3Go_firstijk + β4δi + β5ηi + εijk, 
where δk is a vector of hospital fixed effects and ηi is a vector of patient fixed effects.  
The parameter of interest in these models is β1, which shows the effect of the patient’s 
knowledge on the outcomes.  When Yijk is a health care utilization measure, such as the 
prescription rate for antibiotics, we expect β1 to be significantly negative if patient knowledge 
decreases utilization, and significantly positive if patient knowledge increases utilization. 
When Yijk is a measure of good service quality, such as whether physicians respond politely 
after being thanked, we expect β1 to be significantly negative if patient knowledge degrades 
service quality, and significantly positive if patient knowledge improves service quality. 
As chief physicians are more experienced than attending physicians, there may be 
systematic differences between the practices of chief and attending physicians. Chief 
physicians may react differently to patient knowledge for two reasons. First, in keeping with 
the induced demand literature examining the effects of physician fees, attending physicians 
have lower incomes than chief physicians and may therefore have a stronger incentive to give 
antibiotic prescriptions in order to increase their income.  Alternatively, since attending 
physicians may be less knowledgeable than chief physicians, they may be more likely to make 
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errors, such as prescribing antibiotics when antibiotics are unwarranted.  In this case, they 
may also be less likely to provide information about side effects in response to simulated 
patients A’s intervention. 
We test to see whether patient knowledge has different effects on chief physicians and 
attending physicians by including an interaction term RoleAijk*Attendingj in our model. The 
model then becomes:  
(3) Yijk = γ0 + γ1RoleAijk + γ2Attendingi + γ3RoleAijk*Attendingj + γ4Zi + γ5Go_firstijk + γ6δi 
+ γ7ηi + εijk. 
The parameters of interest in model (3) are γ1, and γ3. The parameter γ1 shows the main 
effect of patient knowledge on chief physicians; γ3 shows the difference between the effects of 
patient knowledge on chief physicians and attending physicians; the sum of γ1 and γ3 shows 
the main effect of patient knowledge on attending physicians.  If the effects are larger for 
attending physicians, then we would expect γ3 to be significant and of the same sign as γ1. 
 
V. RESULTS 
This section summarizes the results regarding physicians’ antibiotic prescribing practices 
and their variations across the three study areas; the effects of patient knowledge on antibiotic 
prescribing; the effects of patient knowledge on physician service quality; and differences in 
outcomes between chief and attending physicians. 
Physicians’ Antibiotic Prescribing Practices 
Table I summarizes baseline prescription rates from the first audit study.  Antibiotic 
prescribing rates are alarmingly high in all three areas.  It is remarkable that the rates are in 22 
 
line with the 40 to 60% rates reported in previous studies, suggesting that much of the 
antibiotic abuse in China may be accounted for by physician behavior without recourse to 
demand-side explanations (Dong et al., 1999; Zhang et al., 2008).  Prescription rates are 
higher in urban areas with 64% of simulated patients receiving such a prescription in the two 
urban areas, compared to 55% in the rural area.  We indicate statistically significant 
differences between average urban and rural areas with asterisks in the “average” column.  
Overall, 62% of the simulated patients received a prescription for an antibiotic.  This high 
rate suggests that Chinese doctors make little distinction between patients with and without 
diagnoses that would merit antibiotic prescription. 
Panel B focuses on the number and type of drugs that are prescribed conditional on a 
prescription.  Most simulated patients actually received prescriptions for three or more drugs 
in urban areas.    In rural areas, the majority received a prescription for two drugs.    In terms of 
the types of drugs prescribed, 14% of patients received prescriptions for penicillin, while 25% 
received prescriptions for the more expensive and powerful cephalosporin.  In general, 
penicillin is considered a “first line” drug for infection, and cephalosporin is a second line drug, 
meaning that it should only be used after penicillin has failed.  Hence, prescription of 
cephalosporin represents a more serious example of antibiotic abuse than prescription of 
penicillin.  Since cephalosporin is on average much more expensive than penicillin, doctors 
have a larger financial incentive to prescribe it.
8    In urban areas, 22% of patients also received 
                                                        
8 Penicillin and cephalosporin are actually classes of drugs, and there are many different types within each 
class, which all have different prices.  However, in City 1 prices for a defined daily dose of penicillin vary 
from 2.80 RMB for Amoxicillan to 6.04 RMB for Ampicillin.  For cephalosporin, the least expensive is 
Cefalexin at 5.24 RMB while the most expensive is Cefdinir (a “third line” antibiotic) at 76.84 RMB.  We 
estimate that in our data, the average course of penicillin was about half the price of the average course of 
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a prescription for Chaihu, which is not an antibiotic but a Chinese medicine commonly used to 
treat colds.  Another striking finding in Panel B is that the abuse of cephalosporin appears to 
be much more common in City 2 and the rural area than in City 1, which is consistent with the 
large differences in medical care that have been observed across areas in countries such as the 
U.S. 
Panel C of Table I shows that physicians are willing to prescribe for absent patients and 
that total drug expenditures are high.  Note that physicians were only asked to prescribe for 
absent relatives in urban areas, and only if they had already prescribed for the simulated 
patient.  As is shown in the top row, when the simulated patient requested medications on 
behalf of his/her absent sister, the physician gives a prescription 85% of the time in City 1, and 
47% of the time in City 2. 
Total drug expenditures are significantly higher in the urban areas than in the rural area, 
though this result is driven by high drug expenditures in City 1. For example, row (3) of Panel 
C shows that the total drug expenditure conditional on prescription is on average 151.51 RMB 
in City 1, more than twice the 52.68 RMB in the rural area.  As the prices of the drugs differ 
little across study areas, the disparity in drug expenditures is driven mainly by different drug 
types, with physicians in City 1 prescribing more expensive drugs on average. 
In Panel C, rows (2) and (3) show total drug expenditures, whereas rows (4) and (5) of 
Panel C show drug expenditures per person. If the physician does not prescribe for the 
simulated patient’s absent sister, then drug expenditure per person equals total drug 
expenditure; if the physician does prescribe for the simulated patient’s absent sister, then drug 
expenditure per person equals total drug expenditure divided by two. Rows (4) and (5) of 24 
 
Panel C show that, even after taking into account the number of patients the physicians 
prescribes for, drug expenditures per person are high and fluctuate across the three study areas. 
As is shown in the bottom row, given that the physician prescribes, drug expenditure per 
person is 84.18 RMB in City 1, 50.68 RMB in City 2, and 52.68 RMB in the rural area. These 
expenditures are high compared to local living standards. They represent 4.1% of the 2,060 
RMB monthly personal income in City 1, 2.4% of the 2,110 RMB personal income in City 2, 
and 4.2% of the 1,271 RMB personal income in the rural area, respectively.
9 
In summary, data from the first audit study demonstrates that: high rates of antibiotic 
abuse are likely due to physician induced demand, at least in our study areas.  Two thirds of 
simulated patients received unwarranted prescriptions for antibiotic drugs; patients were likely 
to receive multiple drug prescriptions; and drug expenditures are high relative to personal 
incomes.  Finally, there were large variations in prescribing patterns across study areas. 
The Effects of Patient Knowledge on Antibiotic Abuse 
Table II shows how patient knowledge affected antibiotic abuse.    The first two columns in 
Table II present summary statistics by simulated patient group. Column (3), (4), (5) and (6) 
present OLS estimates of the parameter α1 from a model without control variables, with 
control variables but without hospital or patient fixed effects, with control variables and 
hospital fixed effects, and with control variables and both hospital and patient fixed effects, 
respectively.  A comparison across columns provides some assurance that the experimental 
design was correctly implemented:  The additional controls should not affect the coefficient 
estimates, and in fact, including them has little impact on the estimates.   
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Panel A of Table II shows that patient knowledge leads to significant decreases in 
prescription rates.  Row (2) indicates that the overall probability that antibiotics were 
prescribed was 25 percentage points less for patient A than for patient B.  Sixty-four percent 
of patient B’s received a prescription for antibiotics, which is very similar to the rate estimated 
in our baseline audit, while only 39% of patient A’s received a prescription.  However, it is 
remarkable that even after patients had questioned the efficacy of antibiotic use, 39% of 
physicians still prescribed antibiotics.   
Patient knowledge not only reduced prescription rates, but also significantly reduced the 
proportion of simulated patients receiving three or more types of drugs, as shown in Panel B of 
Table II.  The first two columns of row (4) show that simulated patient A’s received three or 
more types of drugs 47% of the time, compared to 65% of the time for patient B’s.  Row (3) 
suggests that most of these patients received prescriptions for two drugs instead of three. 
The last three rows of Panel B show that physicians prescribed fewer antibiotics for more 
informed  patients.  In  particular,  they  were  significantly less likely to prescribe cephalosporin, 
the more advanced and expensive antibiotic.  The point estimates suggest that they were 
correspondingly more likely to prescribe Chaihu, the Chinese cold remedy; however, this 
difference is not statistically significant.   
Panel C of Table II illustrates the effects of patient knowledge on drug expenditures. Row 
(2) shows that total drug expenditures for Type A patients were 105.84 RMB, significantly less 
than the 145.81 RMB for Type B patients.  Based on the summary statistics, patient 
knowledge decreases drug expenditure by 39.97 RMB, which is 27% of the expenditure for B.   
Drug expenditures per person are also significantly lower for A than for B.    For example, row 26 
 
(4) demonstrates that patient knowledge decreases drug expenditure per person unconditional 
on prescription by 27.96 RMB from 83.74 RMB to 55.77 RMB. 
In summary, Panel A shows that patient knowledge significantly decreased both the overall 
prescription rate and antibiotic prescription rates, Panel B shows that patient knowledge 
significantly decreased the probability of receiving three or more types of drugs, and Panel C 
shows that patient knowledge significantly decreased drug expenditures. 
The Effects of Patient Knowledge on Service Quality 
Table III shows how patient knowledge affects service quality. Panel A illustrates the 
effects before the information intervention, while Panel B and C illustrate the effects after 
intervention.  
To eliminate the potential effects of differences other than patient knowledge between 
simulated patients A and B, we matched simulated patients A and B, instructed them to report 
the same chief complaint; and randomly assigned the roles of A and B and the sequence of 
their visits. If these measures were effective, then simulated patients A and B should receive 
the same treatment prior to the information intervention.    We can track this by checking to see 
whether the physician performed the same actions in both types of patient prior to the 
information intervention.  Panel A shows that there are indeed no significant differences in 
physician behavior prior to the information intervention.   
After simulated patient A’s intervention, however, there are some significant differences in 
the way that physicians behave towards the two groups of patients, as is shown in Panel B.  
For example, row (3) of Panel B shows that Type A patients received voluntary explanations 
of potential drug side effects from physicians 6% of the time, whereas Type B patients were 27 
 
never given such explanations.  However, patient knowledge seems to have a negative effect 
on the physicians’ attitude, which is reflected in a lower probability of the physician 
responding politely after being thanked. The bottom row of Panel B shows a 20 percentage 
point difference in the probability of a polite response between Type A (57%) and Type B 
patients (73%).   
As discussed above, our simulated patients were asked to rate the physicians after the 
outpatient visit.  This section of our study may have the least external validity in that our 
patients knew that they were not sick, and that they were participating in a study of physician 
behavior.  Hence, their situation was quite different from that of a standard patient.  Still, 
like other similarly situated patients, they brought with them some expectations about how a 
physician should treat them, and it is presumably with reference to these expectations that they 
formed their subjective opinions of physician quality.   
Note that if the simulated patients understood that the point of the experiment was to 
assess antibiotic abuse, then the fact that a physician improperly prescribed antibiotics should 
have caused them to lower their opinion of his or her professional competence.  An 
experimental effect of this type would cause them to evaluate the doctors they saw while in the 
role of patient B more harshly, since physicians were much more likely to improperly 
prescribe antibiotics in experimental condition B.  Thus, if such an experimental effect was 
the only source of differences in physician evaluations, we might expect that patient B’s would 
be less satisfied than patient A’s on average. 
Panel C summarizes the ratings that simulated patients give physicians. The summary 
statistics in the first two columns show that physicians audited while the simulated patient was 28 
 
in role A received lower ratings on average.  However, only the differences in the summary 
measure of whether the patient would be willing to recommend the physician to his/her own 
parents are statistically significant.  This result is consistent with previous research that has 
suggested that the “recommendation question” is a more sensitive measure of patient 
satisfaction (Cheng, Yang and Chiang, 2003). 
Differences Between Chief and Attending Physicians 
Table IV explores differences in the effect of patient knowledge on the antibiotic 
prescribing patterns of chief and attending physicians. Columns (1), (3) and (5) present OLS 
estimates from the model with hospital fixed effects; columns (2), (4) and (6) present estimates 
from the model with hospital fixed effects and patient fixed effects. 
The differences between the effects of patient knowledge on chief physicians and 
attending physicians are reflected in the coefficients on the interaction term  
RoleAijk*Attendingj in columns (5) and (6).  None of the coefficients are significantly 
different than zero.  Overall, Table IV suggests that patient knowledge has little differential 
effect on chief and attending physicians with regard to health care utilization.  
Table V illustrates the effects of patient knowledge on service quality by chief physicians 
and attending physicians.  The main effects in columns (3) and (4) show that patients are 
more satisfied with chief physicians than with attending physicians on average.  One 
indicator of lower quality is that attending physicians are much less likely to give patients any 
instructions about drug usage.  In row (3) of Panel B, the estimates from our preferred model 
show that, given that the physician prescribes medication, patient knowledge increases the 
probability that a chief physician will voluntarily inform the patient about possible side effects 29 
 
by 24 percentage points.   
The probability that an attending physician will offer such information is not affected.  
Hence, all of the increase in the probability of being given information about side effects is 
accounted for by the behavior of chief physicians.  
 
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
We use the audit study method to examine the role physicians plays in inducing 
inappropriate use of antibiotics in China.  Our results are of interest for several reasons.  
First, they demonstrate the feasibility and power of audit studies as a method for measuring 
induced demand.  Our results provide unambiguous evidence that physicians in China often 
prescribe antibiotics when they are unwarranted; and that they tend to prescribe more 
expensive rather than less expensive antibiotics.  They are also unlikely to instruct patients 
about the proper use of antibiotics, or to warn them about side effects, although chief 
physicians are somewhat better than attending physicians in this regard. 
Our study focuses on the supply side rather than the demand side.  It is certainly possible 
that patients demand inappropriate medications, or abuse the medications that they receive.  
However, the rates of doctor initiated antibiotic use we uncovered in our first audit study 
closely mirrors the rates of antibiotic use found in other Chinese studies.  This finding 
suggests that doctor initiated antibiotic use may well explain the high Chinese rates of 
antibiotic abuse. 
In a second contribution we show that having patients demonstrate knowledge of 
appropriate antibiotic use can dramatically reduce the abuse of these powerful medications.  30 
 
Is educating patients and encouraging them to speak up a public policy that could be brought 
“to scale”? We show that from an individual patient’s point of view, there are costs and 
benefits of challenging physicians by demonstrating knowledge.  On the positive side, these 
patients are more likely to be given additional information about possible side effects, and they 
are less likely to be sold expensive medications that are unlikely to be efficacious.  On the 
negative side, there is a deterioration in the quality of their interactions with the physician.  It 
is possible that alternative interventions, such as placing posters about inappropriate antibiotic 
use and possible side effects in doctor’s examining rooms, might have a more positive effect. 
While our findings provide striking evidence about the extent of induced demand for 
antibiotics in China, we caution against drawing overly strong conclusions from our study.  
Audit studies have important advantages over other approaches to investigating induced 
demand in terms of separating supply and demand effects.   However, our results are based on 
a small sample of doctors, in a small number of locations.  Therefore, it will be important to 
assess the generalizabilitiy of our findings in other settings and with larger samples.  Future 
research could also be directed at whether alternative interventions could be equally or more 
effective in reducing antibiotic abuse.  31 
 
APPENDIX I: FIELD EXPERIMENT PROTOCOL 
I. INTRODUATION 
Two audit studies are described in this protocol. Both studies were conducted during the 
flu season. The first was conducted in a large city and one rural county from January 2008 to 
March 2008, and in a second city in January 2009.  The purpose of this first experiment was 
to measure antibiotic prescription rates for symptoms resembling a simple cold in the three 
areas.  The second audit study was conducted in one of the large cities between November 
2008 and February 2009.  The purpose of this audit study was to conduct an experiment 
examining the effect of patient knowledge on physician prescribing patterns and physician 
behavior.   
The basic design of an audit study involves sending testers who follow a prescribed script 
to the people who are being audited.  All of our testers presented with a set of vague 
cold/flu-like symptoms which are described in the script appended to this protocol.  They did 
not ask for antibiotics or any other particular treatment. In the second audit study, we sent 
matched pairs of testers to visit the same physician, with a short time interval between their 
audits. This pair followed the same transcript as in the previous audit except that following the 
physical examination, patient A said “I learned from the internet that simple flu/cold patients 
should not take antibiotics” while patient B said nothing. Thus, A represented a well-informed 
patient and B a less-informed one.    Note that whether the first or second patient played A or B 
was randomly assigned.  Prescriptions and evaluation forms are collected after the audits.  
Sections II and III describe the way in which hospitals and students were selected. Section 
IV describes how students were trained to play the role of a simulated patient. The fifth and 
sixth sections discuss physician-visiting procedures. Section VII provides transcripts of the 
physician visits. Section VIII summarizes criteria for discarding observations, if necessary. 
Section IX describes how testers were asked to evaluate their visits. Lastly, Section X 
describes how we collected further data about the medicines prescribed.   
 
 II. HOSPITAL SELECTION 
All hospitals selected were large general public hospitals with more than 800 beds in cities, 32 
 
or with more than 400 beds in the rural area, excluding traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) 
institutions. We restrict our sample to large general public hospitals because in China, most 
outpatient visits take place in public general hospitals rather than in clinics; hospital outpatient 
visits are the analogue of visits to primary care physician’s offices in the U.S. (Ministry of 
Health of the People's Republic of China 2009).  
Specifically, we selected hospitals according to the following procedure. In the two cities, 
we obtained the list of all large general public hospitals with more than 800 beds from local 
Health Department statistics. We randomly chose nine large general public hospitals in City 1 
and eight in City 2.  In the rural area, we randomly chose 52 general public hospitals with 
more than 400 beds.  
 
 III. STUDENT SELECTION 
Experiment 1 
We recruited students by advertising in collegiate online forums one month before the 
recruitment (i.e. BBS
10), offering a monetary compensation of 40 yuan per hour in rural 
settings or 60 yuan per hour in city settings. Students who responded were interviewed for 
suitability regarding time commitment. Specifically, we told them that they would visit 
approximately 8 hospitals as well as partake in some pre-experiment training and 
post-experiment surveying. 
Due to time and budget constraints in different areas, we recruited 39 simulated patients 
who were college students between 18 and 22 years. Specifically, we recruited 10 simulated 
patients in the first city. Each of the 10 students was assigned 10 hospital visits, resulting in 
100 observations; we recruited 8 simulated patients in the second city, and each of the 8 
students was assigned 8 hospital visits. However, there were two cases that were not usable: In 
one the student went to the wrong hospital.  In the second, the student went to an Emergency 
department rather than to a Department of Respiratory Diseases or Department of Internal 
Medicine. All students had been instructed to go to the Department of Respiratory Diseases (or 
in the absence of such a department, the Department of Internal Medicine) because that is 
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where most non-urgent cases are seen.   
Finally, we recruited 19 simulated patients in the rural area. Nine students were each 
assigned three hospital visits and the remaining 10 students were each assigned four hospital 
visits, resulting in a total of 67 visits. The total number of visits in the three sample areas was 
229 (see Table A. I). We chose more hospitals (52) because rural hospitals are not as busy so 
that multiple students reporting the same symptoms would be likely to stand out.  We chose 
more students because the hospitals are far apart in rural areas so that it would not be practical 
to have the same student visit many hospitals.    
Experiment 2 
For this experiment, the procedures for student selection were exactly the same as those of 
experiment 1. Specifically, we recruited another eight college students, four males and four 
females, from City 1 as simulated patients.   The students were matched by gender, height and 
weight into 4 fixed pairs. Each of the four pairs visited 16 physicians, resulting in 64 pairs of 
visits and 128 observations in total.  In order to investigate differences between chief and 
attending physicians, around two thirds of pairs (48 pairs) visited attending physicians while 
the rest pairs (16 pairs) visited chief physicians.   
 
IV. STUDENT TRAINING 
Simulated patients underwent nine hours of group instruction and individual practice, 
during which they learned the goal of the audit study, how to conduct the study, etc. The 
training process was organized by Dr. Wanchuan Lin, Dr. Wei Zhang and research fellow 
Guoming Shi.  As a graduate student in medical school, Guoming Shi is familiar with the 
Chinese hospital system. The training process progressed as follows: 
1.  The students were gathered in a room. 
2.  The students were asked to sign a pledge of confidentiality.  
3.  The research fellow explained the purpose of the study to the students. 
4.  Students were given voice recorders and instructed how to operate them.  This was 
done in order to ensure procedural accuracy regarding students following the 
transcript during practice sessions. 
5.  Students were next instructed to read and memorize the distributed transcripts. The 34 
 
transcripts included the patient’s chief complaints, and potential doctor responses. 
a)  Transcripts are explained in further details in Section VI. 
b)  Students were asked to give the chief complaint at a normal speech rate of 
around 22 seconds so that they did not speak either too quickly or too slowly. 
6.  Students were separated into pairs and instructed to practice the memorized 
transcripts via role-play (i.e. one student plays the role of the “physician” while the 
other plays the role of the “patient”). 
7.  Each student then practiced the script with either of the two principle investigators, 
Dr. Wanchuan Lin and Dr. Wei Zhang. Each student practiced individually with the 
principle investigator, isolated from the other students. This was done as a check on 
whether the student had memorized the entire transcript and could answer patient 
evaluation questions successfully. 
8.  To ensure that simulated patients were well trained, after the group instruction and 
individual practice, simulated patients tested the protocol five times in out-of-sample 
hospitals before the actual implementation of the first audit study. Each visit was 
recorded using the concealed voice recorder. 
9.  Students were given the patient evaluation questionnaire (see Section IX) and were 
told to memorize these questions and pay attention to them when visiting physicians.  
10. Research assistant and the principle investigators then worked together to analyze the 
recordings of the visits in order to determine whether the standards of the experiment 
had been met. Conditions of analysis included: 
a)  Faithfulness in adhering to the transcript. 
b)  Quantification of speech rate.  
11. Check to ensure completion of the patient evaluation questionnaires (please see 
Section IX). Students who turned in incomplete questionnaires were reminded to pay 
attention to the questions during their future experimental visits. 
12. Neither the names of the hospitals nor the names of the audited physicians were 
recorded at any time, and the audio tapes were destroyed after they had been reviewed 
by the principal investigators as described above.  
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Students who did not perform adequately were asked to redo the in-field training. 
 
V. PHYSICIAN-VISITING PROCEDURES IN EXPERIMENT 1 
This section aims to summarize the simulated patients’ physician visits, beginning with the 
patient registration process (i.e. which department of the hospital to visit and the patient’s 
request for a physician) and ending with the termination of the examination (i.e. the writing of 
a prescription and the physician’s goodbye). Detailed transcripts and patient evaluations can 
be found in Section VII and Section IX. 
The Registration Process 
All of the simulated patients were instructed to go to the Department of Respiratory 
Diseases, or in the absence of such a department, the Department of Internal Medicine. 
In experiment 1, all of the simulated patients asked for an attending physician. The 
registration staff at the hospital assigned a physician after the simulated patients requested to 
see an attending physician in the Department of Respiratory Diseases (or in the absence of 
such a department, the Department of Internal Medicine). Please see transcription 1 (in 
Section VII) for further details. 
Following the registration process, the visit followed the steps shown in the text as Figure 
I. 
 
VI. PHYSICIAN-VISITING PROCEDURES IN EXPERIMENT 2 
The only difference between experiment 1 and experiment 2 is in the Registration Process 
and Physical examination (Please refer to Figure I).  
Registration Process 
In experiment 1, all of the simulated patients asked for an attending physician. In 
experiment 2, however, simulated patients were told before visiting whether they should ask 
for a chief physician or an attending physician. 
Physical Examination 
In experiment 1, during the physical examination, simulated students say nothing about 
antibiotics; in experiment 2, when physicians are performing physical examinations, simulated 
patient A says “I learned from the internet that simple flu/cold patients should not take 36 
 
antibiotics. Is that correct?” while simulated patient B says nothing.  
Visiting orders among these four pairs were determined before doing the experiment. Each 
pair individually decided on four days in which both students were free.  Students visited 4 
hospitals per day, with a total of 16 pair-visit or 32 individual visits.  No sample hospital was 
visited by a pair more than once in three weeks. 
Roles and the order in which each role-playing patient visited the physician were 
randomized in every instance. Before going to the hospital, the simulated patients were given a 
sheet with Table II, containing all the information about roles, the order of visits, etc. 
Specifically, the Case column represents the case number. The Date column represents the 
date on which the case took place. The Student ID column represents which pair of students 
executed any given case. The column marked “Random Variable 1” represents a random 
number generated for the purpose of assigning a student to role A or B.  The Roles column 
shows the role assigned.  “Random Variable 2” shows a random number generated for 
assigning the order of visits (whether A or B goes first).  The Sequence column shows the 
sequence of visits that was assigned. The Random Variable 3 column shows a random number 
generated for assigning chief or attending physician request. The Physician column shows 
whether a chief or attending physician was supposed to be requested. The Hospital ID column 
shows the hospital assigned. The 16 hospitals in Table A.II were selected, numbered, and 
assigned to each pair. 
There were two students in each pair: the first student and the second student. Using the 
Excel function “=rand()”, a random number was generated for each simulated patient pair. If 
the generated number was less than 0.5 (< 0.5), first student was assigned role A and second 
student was assigned role B. Otherwise the first student was assigned role B and second 
student was assigned role A. This randomization was repeated for each distinct physician visit.   




This section provides the transcript of the template for each physician-visit. 
Transcript 1 (Registration Process) 37 
 
1.  Hello, I don’t feel quite well. How can I register? 
2.  I want to see a/chief/attending physician. How much does it cost? 
3.  Where should I go? 
4.  Thank you. 
Transcript 2 (Step 1: Physician Information Collection) 
1.  Hello, doctor! 
2.  For the last two days, I’ve been feeling fatigued. I have been having a low grade fever, 
slight dizziness, a sore throat, and a poor appetite. This morning, the symptoms worsened 
so I took my body temperature. It was 99°F.   
3.  If the doctor asks about the following symptoms: dizziness, fever, throat-ache and poor 
appetite, patients should answer “yes”; if the doctor asks about a cough, simulated patients 
should answer “a little bit” 
4.  Answer NO if asked the following questions: 
Do you feel nauseous? 
Do you have any phlegm? 
Do you have any muscle soreness? 
Have you eaten anything bad or unclean recently? 
Are you currently taking any medications? 
Do you have medicine at home? 
Can you think of anything that might have induced your symptoms? 
5.  Answer “I’m not certain”/ “I don’t know” when asked questions you are not sure of.: e.g. Are you 
allergic to any medications?  
   Transcript 3 (Step 2: Physical Examination) 
Doctor: I’ll give you a physical examination/I will now conduct a physical exam. 
You: Okay. 
Transcript 4 (Step 3: Physician’s Diagnoses and Explanation of Findings) 
Doctor: I’ll prescribe […] for you. 
You: Okay. (ask the physician for information regarding side effects of the medicine after 3-4 
seconds if the physician does not voluntarily inform you of the side effects). 
Transcript 5 (Step 4: Additional Medical Requests for an Absent Sister): 38 
 
You: By the way, doctor, my sister is having similar symptoms. Could you prescribe some 
medicine for her as well? 
Doctor: Yes/No. 
Transcript 6 (Step 5: Departure) 
You: Thank you! (Make sure to bring all notes and prescriptions with you as you leave). 
Doctor: (Does the physician respond politely?). 
 
VIII. CONDITIONS FOR DISCARDING OBSERVATIONS 
The simulated patients did not conduct the survey in one of the selected hospitals. 
1.  The simulated patients did not go to the Department of Respiratory Diseases, or in the 
absence of such a department, the Department of Internal Medicine. 
2.  The simulated patients played the roles incorrectly.  For instance, the patient 
assigned to play A actually played role B or vice versa (Experiment 2 only). 
3.  When the second member of the pair of patients arrived at the hospital, the first 
physician was no longer available (Experiment 2 only). 
In practice, situations 3 and 4 did not arise. 
 
IX. PATIENT EVALUATION 
After completing all the audits, simulated patients were asked to evaluate their visit 
according to the following questionnaire.  Note that when someone goes to the hospital in 
China, the doctor will often record information about the visit in a booklet that serves as an 
outpatient medical record.  Hence, patients are also asked about this booklet below. 
 
Registration Process 
1: Was the registration staff polite? Did they include greetings such as “Hello”, “Please”, “You 
are welcome” etc.? 
Step 1: Physician Information Collection 
(Note, that the only information retained about physicians was their gender, and their 
approximate age). 
2: What was the gender of the physician? 39 
 
(1) Male    (2) Female 
3: What was the approximate age of the physician? 
(1) 20-30    (2)30-40     (3) 40-50     (4) above 50 
4A: Was there an outpatient medical record? (If there is, do not fill in any of your own patient 
information, i.e. name, age, etc. The purpose of this question is to determine whether the 
physician is kind enough to fill in the outpatient record on behalf of the patient.) 
4B: If there was an outpatient medical record did the physician fill in your name, age etc. for 
you? 
5A: Were you interrupted by the physician before you finished your chief complaints?  
5B: If yes, how many times did he interrupt? 
      (1)1 time   (2) 2 times   (3) 3 times  (4) 4 times  (5) 5 and above  
6: Did the physician ask whether or not you have cough symptoms? 
7: Did the physician ask whether or not you have sputum? 
Step 2      Physical Examination 
8: Did the physician/nurse take your temperature? 
9A: Did the physician examine your tonsils? 
9B: If yes, did the physician give you some information about the examination￿ 
10A: Did the physician use a stethoscope? 
10B: If yes, did the physician give you some information about the examination￿ 
Step 3      Physicians Diagnose and Explain Findings 
11: Did the physician ask you whether you have a history of allergies? 
12: Did the physician ask you whether you have cold medicine at home? 
13A: Did the physician prescribe medication(s)? 
13B: If yes, did the physician take initiative in telling you how to use the medicine? (i.e. before 
meals, after meals, how many times a day, how many pills a time, etc.) 
13C: If yes, did the physician take initiative in telling you the side effects of the medicine? 
13D: If no, did the physician explain after you asked him/her? 
14: Did the physician take initiative in telling you to pay attention to certain things? (i.e. drink 
more, have more rest). 
Step 4      Additional Medical Requests for an Absent Sister 40 
 
15: Was the physician willing to prescribe medication for your “absent sister”? 
Step 5      Departure   
16: Did the doctor explain what disease you might have? 
17: After you said “Thank you, doctor,” did the physician respond to you with polite words 
like “You are welcome”, etc? 
Satisfaction Appraisement for Physician (scores) 
Lastly, simulated patients evaluated the service they received from each physician. Service 
and degree of satisfaction were rated on a scale of 1 to 5 (low to high). 
18: How considerate was your physician during your hospital visit? 
(1)extremely inconsiderate  (2)not very considerate  (3)neutral  (4)very considerate  (5) 
Extremely considerate 
19: How would you rate the medical capability of your doctor?  
(1) very bad   (2) bad   (3) neutral   (4) good   (5) very good 
20: How respectful was the physician of your opinions during the diagnosing process? 
(1)very disrespectful  (2)disrespectful  (3)neutral  (4)respectful  (5)very respectful 
21: Do you think the physician offered you enough information about your treatment and 
illness? 
(1) definitely not enough  (2) no  (3) neutral  (4) yes  (5) definitely enough 
22: Overall, how was your experience? 
(1) extremely bad   (2) very bad   (3) neutral  (4) very good  (5) extremely good 
23: Would you recommend this physician to your parents, given that they presented with the 
same symptoms? (Score between 0 and 10, exclude external factors such as travel 
inconvenience). 
 
X. PRESCRIPTION ANALYSIS 
All the simulated patients were asked to turn their prescriptions over to two research 
assistants who were hired by the medical department of Peking University. By analyzing these 
prescriptions, the research assistants obtained the following information: 
1: The total number of drugs prescribed. 
2: Whether antibiotics were prescribed. 41 
 
3: If yes, the level of antibiotic prescribed where there are 3 levels: 
1)  unlimited medicine; 2) limited medicine; 3) specialized medicine. 
4: The cost of the drugs prescribed. 
5: Whether there were likely to be any adverse interactions between the medicines prescribed? 
 
Costs were determined as follows.  If the physician did not prescribe, then the drug 
expenditure was zero. If drugs were prescribed, expenditures were calculated in one of three 
ways: In some cases, the cost of the drug(s) was already listed on the prescription, so we could 
calculate the drug expenditure directly. If the physician didn’t provide the price information on 
the prescription, patients obtained total drug costs from the hospital pharmacy.  If we could 
not obtain drug prices from the hospital pharmacy, we searched for them either on the website 
of the local Price Bureau or through Google or Baidu. 
  After being analyzed, the prescriptions were destroyed. 42 
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Figure I : Field Experiment Protocol 48 
 
C i t y  1C i t y  2A v g .
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A. Prescription rates
Prescription rate 0.90 0.96 0.82 0.91 0.88
[0.30] [0.20] [0.39] [0.29] [0.33]
Unconditional prescription rate for antibiotics 0.62 0.64 0.68 0.65*** 0.55
[0.49] [0.48] [0.47] [0.48] [0.50]
Prescription rate for antibiotics 0.69 0.67 0.82 0.72** 0.63
  conditional on prescription [0.46] [0.47] [0.39] [0.45] [0.49]
Panel B. Types of drugs (conditional on prescription)
Number of drugs prescribed 2.69 2.92 2.57 2.80*** 2.42
[0.94] [1.05] [0.70] [0.96] [0.83]
One type of drug prescribed  0.06 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.07
[0.23] [0.24] [0.20] [0.23] [0.25]
Two types of drugs prescribed  0.40 0.27 0.43 0.33*** 0.58
[0.49] [0.45] [0.50] [0.47] [0.50]
Three or more types of drugs prescribed  0.54 0.67 0.53 0.62*** 0.36
[0.50] [0.47] [0.50] [0.49] [0.48]
Three most commonly prescribed drugs in this study:
Prescription rate for cephalosporin  0.25 0.19 0.35 0.24 0.25
[0.43] [0.39] [0.48] [0.43] [0.44]
Prescription rate for chaihu  0.17 0.19 0.27 0.22*** 0.05
[0.38] [0.39] [0.45] [0.41] [0.22]
Prescription rate for penicillin  0.14 0.16 0.10 0.14 0.14
[0.34] [0.36] [0.3] [0.34] [0.35]
Panel C. Drug expenditures
Physician prescribes drug for absent sister 0.50 0.85 0.47 0.70*** N/A
[0.50] [0.36] [0.50] [0.46]
Total drug expenditure in RMB (unconditional) 92.79 145.45 58.00 111.98*** 46.39
[88.69] [99.18] [40.05] [92.05] [58.43]
Total drug expenditure in RMB (conditional) 103.15 151.51 70.51 123.41*** 52.68
[87.61] [96.55] [32.51] [89.02] [59.57]
Unconditional drug expenditure per person (RMB) 66.87 84.18 50.68 72.56*** 52.68
[54.05] [55.62] [30.10] [50.79] [59.57]
Conditional drug expenditure per person (RMB) 66.87 84.18 50.68 72.56*** 52.68
[54.05] [55.62] [30.10] [50.79] [59.57]
Number of hospitals 83 23 8 31 52
Number of observations 229 100 62 162 67
Notes.   Standard deviations are in brackets. 5. (***, **, *) denote that the difference between urban and rural areas is
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. If the physician does not prescribe for simulated patient’s absent
sister, drug expenditure per person equals total drug expenditure; if the physician prescribes for simulated patient’s
absent sister, drug expenditure per person equals total drug expenditure divided by two.
TABLE I










Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Prescription rate 0.83*** 0.97 -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.13** -0.12**
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Prescription rate for antibiotics (unconditional on prescription) 0.39*** 0.64 -0.25*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.22***
[0.09] [0.09] [0.08] [0.08]
Prescription rate for antibiotics (conditional on prescription) 0.47** 0.66 -0.19** -0.19* -0.18** -0.17*
[0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09]
Number of drugs prescribed  2.57 2.84 -0.27 -0.28 -0.26 -0.24
[0.17] [0.17] [0.16] [0.16]
One type of drug prescribed  0.06 0.06 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Two types of drugs prescribed  0.47** 0.29 0.18** 0.19** 0.18** 0.15*
[0.09] [0.09] [0.08] [0.09]
Three or more types of drugs prescribed 0.47* 0.65 -0.17* -0.18* -0.18** -0.15*
[0.09] [0.09] [0.08] [0.09]
Prescription for cephalosporin 0.08* 0.19 -0.12* -0.11* -0.11* -0.12*
[0.06] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06]
Prescription for chaihu  0.26 0.18 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.05
[0.08] [0.08] [0.06] [0.06]
Prescription for penicillin  0.11 0.18 -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07
[0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06]
Panel C. Drug expenditures
Physician prescribed drug on behalf of an absent sister 0.75 0.81 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02
[0.07] [0.07] [0.06] [0.06]
Total drug expenditure in RMB (unconditional on prescription) 105.84** 145.81 -39.97** -36.57** -36.89** -36.25**
[17.07] [17.41] [15.46] [15.89]
Total drug expenditure in RMB (conditional on prescription) 127.80 150.51 -22.71 -18.97 -16.24 -15.24
[17.44] [17.93] [14.13] [14.53]
Unconditional drug expenditure per person (RMB) 55.77*** 83.74 -27.96*** -27.64*** -27.61*** -28.26***
[9.37] [9.67] [8.91] [9.12]
Conditional drug expenditure per person (RMB) 67.35** 86.44 -19.09** -16.40* -14.91* -15.05*
[9.62] [9.81] [8.19] [8.35]
Control variables √√√
Hospital fixed effects √√
Patient fixed effects √
TABLE II
EFFECTS OF PATIENT KNOWLEDGE ON HEALTH CARE UTILIZATION
Coefficient on Role Aijk
Panel A. Prescription rates
Notes.   (***, **, *) denote that the difference between simulated patients A and B or the coefficient on "RoleAijk" is significant at the 1%, 5%









Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Before Intervention
Physician asks patient about coughing 0.75 0.78 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.00
[0.08] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07]
Physician asks patient about sputum 0.38 0.39 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00
[0.09] [0.09] [0.08] [0.08]
Physician/nurse takes patient's temperature 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00
[0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06]
Physician checks tonsils 0.95 0.92 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04
[0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
Physician uses a stethoscope 0.39 0.41 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
[0.09] [0.08] [0.07] [0.08]
Panel B. After Intervention (conditional on prescription)
Physician asks about allergies 0.68 0.73 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.02
[0.09] [0.08] [0.08] [0.07]
Physician instructs on drug usage  0.38 0.35 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03
[0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.08]
Physician voluntarily informs patient of drug side effects  0.06* 0.00 0.06* 0.05* 0.06* 0.06**
[0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Physician voluntarily suggests drinking more water, etc. 0.45 0.58 -0.12 -0.11 -0.11 -0.10
[0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09]
Physician responds politely after being thanked 0.57* 0.73 -0.16* -0.15* -0.15* -0.14*
[0.09] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08]
Panel C. Ratings of Service Evaluation (after outpatient visit)
Degree of care from the physician (1-5: lowest-highest) 3.34 3.52 -0.18 -0.15 -0.13 -0.07
[0.23] [0.23] [0.23] [0.23]
Physician's professional competency (1-5: lowest-highest) 3.39 3.55 -0.16 -0.14 -0.13 -0.09
[0.20] [0.21] [0.21] [0.21]
Degree of respect from the physician (1-5: lowest-highest) 3.30 3.57 -0.27 -0.29 -0.29 -0.19
[0.22] [0.21] [0.20] [0.19]
Patient's satisfaction with information provided (1-5: lowest-highest) 3.07 3.32 -0.25 -0.21 -0.20 -0.12
[0.25] [0.24] [0.24] [0.24]
Patient's satisfaction with the visit (1-5: lowest-highest) 3.20 3.48 -0.27 -0.24 -0.22 -0.15
[0.22] [0.22] [0.21] [0.21]
Patient's willingness to recommend the physician to his/her own
parents (0-10: will not recommend-high recommendation)
5.36* 6.36 -1.00* -0.93* -0.88* -0.69
[0.51] [0.50] [0.50] [0.48]
Control variables √√√
Hospital fixed effects √√
Patient fixed effects √
TABLE III
EFFECTS OF PATIENT KNOWLEDGE ON SERVICE QUALITY, BEFORE AND AFTER INFORMATION INTERVETION
Coefficient on Role Aijk
Notes.  (***, **, *) denote that the difference between simulated patients A and B or the coefficient on "Role Aijk" is significant at the 1%, 5% and
10% level, respectively.  51 
 
Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Prescription rates
Prescription rate -0.22** -0.21** -0.16* -0.16* 0.12 0.13
[0.10] [0.09] [0.09] [0.09] [0.11] [0.11]
Prescription rate for antibiotics (unconditional on prescription) -0.26 -0.22 -0.06 0.01 0.04 0.00
[0.16] [0.16] [0.15] [0.15] [0.19] [0.19]
Prescription rate for antibiotics (conditional on prescription) -0.16 -0.13 0.03 0.08 -0.02 -0.06
[0.18] [0.18] [0.16] [0.16] [0.20] [0.21]
Panel B. Types of drugs (conditional on prescription)
Types of drugs prescribed -0.05 -0.04 -0.39 -0.33 -0.28 -0.27
[0.31] [0.33] [0.28] [0.29] [0.37] [0.38]
One type of drug prescribed -0.09 -0.07 -0.07 -0.09 0.12 0.10
[0.09] [0.09] [0.08] [0.08] [0.11] [0.11]
Two types of drugs prescribed 0.12 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.12
[0.17] [0.18] [0.15] [0.16] [0.20] [0.21]
Three or more types of drugs prescribed -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.20 -0.22
[0.17] [0.18] [0.15] [0.16] [0.20] [0.20]
Prescription for cephalosporin -0.10 -0.11 0.11 0.12 -0.01 -0.01
[0.12] [0.13] [0.11] [0.11] [0.14] [0.14]
Prescription for chaihu 0.00 0.00 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.07 0.07
[0.12] [0.12] [0.11] [0.11] [0.14] [0.14]
Prescription for penicillin -0.08 -0.09 0.13 0.15 0.00 0.03
[0.12] [0.12] [0.10] [0.11] [0.13] [0.14]
Panel C. Drug expenditures
Physician prescribed drug on behalf of an absent sister -0.03 -0.04 -0.11 -0.15 0.00 0.02
[0.12] [0.12] [0.11] [0.12] [0.14] [0.15]
Total drug expenditure in RMB (unconditional on prescription) -76.26** -81.33** -44.44 -43.38 53.59 61.21*
[30.20] [31.20] [27.97] [28.79] [35.40] [36.57]
Total drug expenditure in RMB (conditional on prescription) -27.83 -31.43 -6.59 -4.91 15.66 21.63
[28.32] [29.47] [25.45] [26.15] [33.11] [34.21]
Unconditional drug expenditure per person (RMB) -50.23*** -53.13*** -19.87 -16.20 30.80 33.76
[17.41] [17.92] [16.12] [16.53] [20.40] [21.00]
Drug expenditure per person in RMB (conditional on prescription) -18.89 -22.29 2.65 6.02 5.38 9.67
[16.43] [16.95] [14.67] [15.04] [19.21] [19.67]
Control variables √√ √√ √√
Hospital fixed effects √√ √√ √√
Patient fixed effects √ √ √
TABLE IV









Dependent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Physician asks patient about coughing -0.01 -0.02 -0.08 -0.14 -0.02 0.03
[0.13] [0.13] [0.12] [0.12] [0.16] [0.15]
Physician asks patient about sputum 0.09 0.09 -0.19 -0.21 -0.13 -0.12
[0.15] [0.16] [0.14] [0.15] [0.18] [0.19]
Physician/nurse takes patient's temperature -0.02 -0.01 -0.12 -0.16 0.04 0.02
[0.11] [0.11] [0.10] [0.10] [0.13] [0.13]
Physician checks tonsil -0.02 -0.02 -0.14* -0.15** 0.06 0.08
[0.08] [0.08] [0.07] [0.07] [0.09] [0.09]
Physician uses a stethoscope 0.17 0.18 -0.48*** -0.49*** -0.25 -0.27
[0.14] [0.15] [0.13] [0.14] [0.17] [0.17]
Panel B. After Intervention (conditional on prescription)
Physician asks about allergies 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.02 -0.11 -0.14
[0.16] [0.14] [0.14] [0.12] [0.18] [0.16]
Physician instructs on drug usage  0.02 0.04 -0.25 0.31** -0.01 -0.02
[0.17] [0.16] [0.15] [0.14] [0.20] [0.19]
Physician voluntarily informs patient of drug side effects  0.21*** 0.24*** -0.01 -0.01 -0.21*** -0.24***
[0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.07] [0.06]
Physician voluntarily suggests drinking more water, etc. -0.17 -0.18 -0.25 -0.27* 0.08 0.11
[0.17] [0.18] [0.16] [0.16] [0.20] [0.21]
Physician responds with polite words after being thanked -0.24 -0.30* -0.03 -0.04 0.12 0.22
[0.16] [0.16] [0.15] [0.14] [0.19] [0.19]
Panel C. Service Evaluation (after outpatient visits)
Degree of care from the physician  0.05 0.10 -0.74* -0.87** -0.24 -0.21
[0.49] [0.47] [0.43] [0.42] [0.55] [0.54]
Physician's professional competency  0.00 -0.02 -0.63 -0.72* -0.18 -0.08
[0.45] [0.44] [0.39] [0.39] [0.50] [0.50]
Degree of respect from the physician  -0.15 -0.13 -0.66* -0.83** -0.18 -0.07
[0.44] [0.41] [0.38] [0.36] [0.49] [0.46]
Patient's satisfaction with information provided -0.12 -0.16 -1.15** -1.31*** -0.10 0.05
[0.51] [0.50] [0.45] [0.44] [0.58] [0.57]
Patient's satisfaction with the visit -0.13 -0.16 -1.03** -1.17*** -0.11 0.00
[0.46] [0.44] [0.40] [0.38] [0.51] [0.50]
Willingness to recommend the physician to a parent -0.35 -0.49 -2.27** -2.66*** -0.68 -0.26
[1.07] [1.00] [0.939] [0.878] [1.208] [1.134]
Control variables √√ √√ √√
Hospital fixed effects √√ √√ √√
Patient fixed effects √√ √
Note.  1. (***, **, *) denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
TABLE V
EFFECTS OF PATIENT KNOWLEDGE ON SERVICE QUALITY BY PHYSICIAN TITLE























10 Students Assigned 10
Hospital
8 Students Assigned 8
Hospital ( 2 Unusable
Observations)
229 Observations in total
39 Students in total
Specific Arrangement
Obeservation
 STUDENT ASSIGNMENT AND NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS
 54 
 



























































































































































































































































Notes.  (1)If random variable 1 is less or equal to 0.5,then the role assignment is "1=A,2=B".If random variable 1 is more than 0.5,
then the role assignment is "1=B,2=A". (2)If random variable 2 is less or equal to 0.5, then the sequence is "A First". If random
variable 2 is more than 0.5, then the sequence is "B First".(3)If random variable 3 is less to equal to 0.25, then we choose chief
physicians. If random variable 3 is more than 0.25, we choose attending physician.  